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Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.:
Attorney Disqualification for Conflict of Interest
INTRODUCTION

Kirkland & Ellis (Kirkland) is a large,' prestigious two-city law
firm. Its Chicago office (Kirkland-Chicago) had represented Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Westinghouse) for over 15 years
when the firm became involved in the defense of several breach of
contract suits filed against Westinghouse. These suits had resulted
from Westinghouse's alleged inability to supply uranium to the
plaintiffs.! As an outgrowth of a defense presented in the contract
actions, Kirkland filed an antitrust suit on behalf of Westinghouse 3
against 29 corporations engaged in the uranium industry. By the
time this antitrust suit had been filed, Kirkland had already generated legal fees of 2.5 million dollars conducting the contract aspect
of the litigation alone. Despite this extensive involvement with
Westinghouse, the Seventh Circuit disqualified Kirkland from acting as Westinghouse's counsel in the antitrust action.4
The disqualification issue arose as a result of Kirkland's simultaneous representation of Westinghouse and the American Petroleum
Institute (API), a trade association. The API had commissioned
Kirkland's Washington, D.C. office (Kirkland-Washington) to prepare a report for use in a congressional lobbying effort. In compiling
data for the study, Kirkland-Washington attorneys received confidential information from several API members, including three oil
companies5 who were later named as defendants in the Westinghouse antitrust action. Although the API report was released on the
same day that the uranium antitrust suit was filed by KirklandChicago, it developed a thesis opposite to that of the lawsuit. In
particular, the report stated that the uranium industry was highly
competitive, while the lawsuit alleged a price-fixing conspiracy
among uranium producers.
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility6 sets forth stan1. There are 130 members in the Chicago office of Kirkland & Ellis, and 40 members in
the Washington, D.C. office, whose official name is Kirkland, Ellis & Rowe.
2. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (N.D. I11.1978).
3. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
4. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, __
U.S. -,
99 S. Ct. 353 (1978). For a comprehensive statement of the background to the Westinghouse disqualification decision, see text accompanying notes 55
through 64 infra.
5. The three defendants in the antitrust suit are Kerr-McGee Corp., Gulf Oil Corp. and
Getty Oil Co.
6. The ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSImLrry contains Canons, Ethical Considera-
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dards of conduct, the breach of which may result in disqualification.

In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,7 the Seventh
Circuit considered the applicability of Canons 4, 5 and 9 to the
ethical dilemma in which Kirkland had become embroiled. Canon
4 provides that an attorney should preserve client confidences and
secrets.8 Canon 5 states that lawyers should exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of their clients,9 while Canon 9
cautions against even the appearance of professional impropriety. 0
The court found that Kirkland's conduct had not met these standards."
In discharging Kirkland, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the district court had abused its discretion 2 in finding that disqualification
tions (EC) and Disciplinary Rules (DR). The Preliminary Statement of the Code describes
each as follows:
The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the
standards of professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the
public, with the legal system, and with the legal profession. They embody the
general concepts from which the Ethical Consideration and the Disciplinary Rules
are derived.
The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They constitute
a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific
situations.
The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in
character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which
no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. Within the framework of fair trial, the Disciplinary Rules should be uniformly applied to all lawyers,
regardless of the nature of their professional activities. The Code makes no attempt
to prescribe -either disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor does it undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers
for professional conduct. The severity of judgment against one found guilty of
violating a Disciplinary Rule should be determined by the character of the offense
and the attendant circumstances. An enforcing agency, in applying the Disciplinary
Rules, may find interpretive guidance in the basic principles embodied in the
Canons and in the objectives reflected in the Ethical Considerations.
7. 580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
8. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY, Canon 4 provides: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."
9. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 5 provides: "A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of-a client."
10. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONStILrrY, Canon 9 provides: "A lawyer should avoid
even the appearance of professional impropriety."
11. See text accompanying notes 81 through 92 infra.
12. 580 F.2d 1311, 1318 (7th Cir. 1978). In ruling on a disqualification motion, trial courts
exercise broad discretion. Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). This court held: "[Tihe district court . . . is authorized
to supervise the conduct of the members of its bar . . . . ITihe regulation of attorneys ...
will be disturbed only when, on review of the record, we can say that the district court abused
its permissible discretion." 469 F.2d at 1385-86 (citations omitted). Accord, Fred Weber, Inc.
v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706
(7th Cir. 1976); NCK Org'n, Ltd. v. Bregman, 542 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1976); Cinema 5, Ltd. v.
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was not an appropriate remedy for the ethical transgressions involved. The lower court had performed an equitable balancing test
and concluded that the harm caused by disqualification would outweigh any possible benefits. The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with this reasoning.
This article will examine applicable case law on attorney disqualification, analyze the Westinghouse decision, and demonstrate its
limited precedential value.
BACKGROUND ON DISQUALIFICATION CRITERIA

Canon 4: Maintaining Client Confidences
A trio of Second Circuit cases decided in the 1950's established
the basic criteria for attorney disqualification under Canon 6 of the
ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, which evolved into the present
Canon 4 of the Code.' 3 All three cases involved antitrust matters in
the motion picture industry. In T. C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures" plaintiff's attorney had previously represented one of the
defendants in a matter involving antitrust violations similar to
those alleged by T.C. Theatre Corp. In deciding to discharge the
attorney," the court established two general rules regarding disqualification.
The first rule provided that "[wihere any substantial
relationship can be shown between the subject matter of a former
representation and that of a subsequent adverse representation, the
latter will be prohibited.'e The second rule stated that when the
former client can demonstrate a substantial relationship, the court
will assume that confidences were disclosed during the course of the
former employment. 7 However, the court suggested that these two
principles should be applied only where it can reasonably be asCinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976); Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir.
1975).
13. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmics No. 6, which remained in effect until January
1, 1970, provided in pertinent part:
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his
secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with
respect to which confidence has been reposed.
14. 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
15. It is not clear from the opinion whether the disqualified attorney was a member of a
law firm. In any event, the court did not consider the issue of representation of T.C. Theatre
Corp. by other members of his firm, if any.
16. 113 F. Supp. at 268 (emphasis added). The court did not establish any guidelines for
determining what constitutes a substantial relation between the subject matter of former and
subsequent representation.
17. 113 F. Supp. at 268. The court noted that it would refrain from inquiring into the
contents of these confidences in order to protect the client. Id.
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sumed that information acquired during the earlier representation
relates to the subject matter of the later representation.
In Conslidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit
Management," the court extended the holding in T.C. Theatre
Corp. by disqualifying an entire law firm. One of the plaintiffs
attorneys had been previously employed by a firm whose principal
clients included one of the defendants being sued by Consolidated.
The court reasoned that it was logical to infer that during the course
of his former employment the attorney either received or had access
to confidential information regarding the defendant. 0 The most notable aspect of Consolidated is its summary disqualification of an
entire law firm without citing precedent or discussing its rationale.2'
The court inferred that a single attorney of the firm possessed confidential knowledge of the former client's legal affairs, and proceeded
to impute the single attorney's inferred knowledge to every member
of the firm with which he was associated.
Laskey Bros. of W. Va. v. Warner Bros. Pictures12 expanded the
imputation of knowledge principle implicit in Consolidated, but
also established the first limitation upon the extent to which imputed knowledge would be irrebuttably presumed. The Laskey
court held that once a partner in a law firm was vicariously 23 disqualified from a case, the subsequent dissolution of the partnership
24
would not remove his ineligibility to act as counsel in that case.
The court then distinguished the situation in which an attorney,
previously vicariously disqualified by virtue of his partnership affiliations, accepted a "new case having no relationship to the old partnership."25 It 'held that the imputation of knowledge in that situation would be "logically less compelling and should therefore become rebuttable legally, lest the chain of disqualification become
endless." 6
18. Id. at 269.
19. 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954).
20. Id. at 925.
21. Id. at 928.
22. 224 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956).
23. The term "vicariously" is used to refer to situations in which knowledge is imputed
to firm members having no actual knowledge of client confidences.
24. 224 F.2d at 826-27.
25. Id. at 827 (emphasis added).
26. Id. The logic of the court in reaching this conclusion was less than compelling. It
changed the focus delineated in T. C. Theatre Corp. from the relationship of the subject
matter of the two representations to the relationship of a new case to a dissolved partnership.
The two pieces of litigation at issue in Laskey involved the same defendant and substantially
the same subject matter. Yet the same attorney was disqualified in one piece of litigation but
not disqualified in the other because in the latter action his client had not previously been
represented by the old firm. This decision may have been based more on policy considerations
than on concern for principles of logic. It stressed that an irrebuttable inference that confiden-
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Later courts have approved and followed the criteria established
by T. C. Theatre Corp., Consolidated, and Laskey. The justification presented for strict enforcement of these standards is the maintenance of client confidence in attorneys. A client must be able to
discuss his legal problems with his attorney openly and in depth,
without fear that the information he reveals may one day be used
against him. Therefore, a client must be assured that the lawyer will
be permanently barred from taking a position adverse to him in
regard to any matters substantially related to those in which the
attorney represented him. The result may be that the attorney and
his firm are disqualified even though no confidential information
was received or divulged. However, the loss of possible clients is
thought to be a necessary price to pay in return for the assurance of
competent legal representation, which can only be enhanced by
honesty and candor between an attorney and his client.
Canon 5: Multiple Clients
The gist of Canon 5 of the ABA Code is that an attorney cannot
tial information had been received by the attorney in question was too harsh, especially for
young lawyers who have had temporary affiliations with large law firms. Under such a rule,
prospective employers might be hesitant to hire attorneys if in so doing they would be incurring the possibility of loss of clients due to imputed confidential knowledge. The rule could
also have detrimental effects on the ability of clients to retain technically trained attorneys
in specialized areas who would not be disqualified due to their peripheral or temporally
remote connections with attorneys representing an opposite side. Id. at 827.
27. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); Fred
Weber, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977); Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc.,
546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973); Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F. Supp. 209 (N.D.
Ill. 1975); Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub nor. Hall v. A. Corp.,
453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972); Empire Linotype School, Inc. v. United States, 143 F. Supp.
627 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
28. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1973); Laskey Bros.
of W. Va. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 224 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Several ethical considerations and disciplinary rules promulgated under Canon 4 of the
Code appear to have evolved from cases construing ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIc No.
6. See note 13 supra. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmiurrY, EC 4-1, provides:
Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client and the proper
functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of confidences
and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him. A client must feel
free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer and a lawyer must be equally
free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client. A lawyer should
be fully informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client
to obtain the full advantage of our legal system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise
of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and important
from the irrelevant and unimportant. The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client not only facilitates
the full development of facts essential to proper representation of the client but also
encourages laymen to seek early legal assistance.
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serve two masters. He owes undivided loyalty to each of his clients.
The Code cautions that such loyalty may not be possible if two
current clients, or a present and a former client, have conflicting
interests.29 Conflict of interest under Canon 5 has seldom been construed by the courts, and then only recently. 3 0 One such decision,
Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc.,31 is important because it sheds
light on the burden of proof to be met by an attorney accused of a
Canon 5 violation.
Cinema 5, Ltd. involved a lawyer who was a partner in both a
Buffalo and a New York City law firm. The Buffalo firm filed suit
on behalf of a client against a client of the New York firm. In
affirming a disqualification order, the Second Circuit noted that an
attorney-client relationship which is terminated differs from an ongoing relationship such as that found in the instant case. Whereas
the parameters of the relationship are fixed in the former situation,
29.

ABA

ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-1, provides:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the bounds of
the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising influences and
loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests of other clients, nor the desires
of third persons should be permitted to dilute his loyalty to his client.
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,

EC 5-14, states:

Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely affect his
judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem arises whenever
a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may have differing interests,
whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise discordant.
Canon 5 is closely related to Canon 4 in that simultaneous representation creates a potential
situation in which an attorney might disclose or betray the confidences of another client.
30. In two recent cases, Canon 5 issues were decided using only the language of the Canon
and the ethical considerations and disciplinary rules promulgated thereunder. Fred Weber,
Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1977); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir.
1977). Both cases involved a conflict between a present and former client.
Other Canon 5 cases reveal that courts are beginning to consider the multiplicity of factual
situations under which a motion to disqualify can arise. Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 532
F.2d 1118 (7th Cir. 1976), examined whether counsel can represent both the officers and
directors of the corporation as well as the corporation itself in a shareholders' derivative suit.
The court reasoned that potential conflict of interest existed because although the corporation
was aligned as a defendant, it was a defendant in name only. The Seventh Circuit adopted
the lower court's opinion, which had ordered the corporation to acquire new counsel. See
Prunty, The Shareholders' Derivative Suit: Notes on Its Derivation, 32 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 980
(1957), for historical background on the peculiarities of a shareholders' derivative suit. Such
suits require that a corporation's shareholders name the corporation as a defendant. The
result, however, is that the shareholders are in reality suing themselves.
In Whiting Corp. v. White Mach. Corp., 567 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1977), a law firm represented
both the plaintiff in the action and a corporation which owned 20% of the outstanding stock
of the defendant corporation. The firm was permitted to continue its representation of the
plaintiff but was prohibited from representing or advising the corporation owning 20% of
defendant's stock for the duration of this suit.
31. 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976).
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they remain indefinite in the latter. 3 Therefore, the court reasoned,
in a case of simultaneous adverse representation, a disqualification
motion must be decided under more rigorous criteria than the substantial relationship test applied in Canon 4 cases.3
In holding dual representation in litigation prima facie improper,
the court succeeded in establishing a higher standard. In order to
defeat a motion for disqualification, the attorney must as a minimum requirement convince the court that there will be no actual
or apparent conflict in his loyalties or diminution in the vigor of his
34
representation.
Although Canon 5 has been relied on as a basis for attorney disqualification in cases such as Cinema 5, Ltd., EC 5-15 35 and EC 51631 indicate that multiple representation may be permissible in
litigation where the clients' interests are only potentially adverse.
Furthermore, within certain confines, these ethical considerations
allow multiple representation in legal matters other than those involving litigation. However, such dual representation is limited by
Canon 9 considerations.
32. Id. at 1387.
33. Id.
34. Id. The court gave no indication of what would be required beyond this initial burden,
as the attorney in the case had failed to meet this minimum standard.
35. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RxSPONSISILITY, EC 5-15, provides:
If a lawyer is requested to undertake or to continue representation of multiple
clients having potentially differing interests, he must weigh carefully the possibility
that his judgment may be impaired or his loyalty divided if he accepts or continues
the employment. He should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation. A lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with differing
interests; and there are few situations in which he would be justified in representing
in litigation multiple clients with potentially differing interests. If a lawyer accepted such employment and the interests did become actually differing, he would
have to withdraw from employment with likelihood of resulting hardship on the
clients; and for this reason it is preferable that he refuse the employment initially.
On the other hand, there are many instances in which a lawyer may properly serve
multiple clients having potentially differing interests in matters not involving litigation. If the interests vary only slightly, it is generally likely that the lawyer will
not be subjected to an adverse influence and that he can retain his independent
judgment on behalf of each client; and if the interests become differing, withdrawal
is less likely to have a disruptive effect upon the causes of his clients.
36. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 5-16, states:
In those instances in which a lawyer is justified in representing two or more clients
having differing interests, it is nevertheless essential that each client be given the
opportunity to evaluate his need for representation free of any potential conflict and
to obtain other counsel if he so desires. Thus before a lawyer may represent multiple
clients, he should explain fully to each client the implications of the common
representation and should accept or continue employment only if the clients consent. If there are present other circumstances that might cause any of the multiple
clients to question the undivided loyalty of the lawyer, he should also advise all of
the clients of those circumstances.
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Canon 9: Appearance of Impropriety
Canon 9 is far more comprehensive in its reach than either Canons
4 or 5.31 For this reason, recent cases indicate a trend toward resolving conflict of interest cases either by using Canon 9 exclusively, or
else in conjunction with Canons 4 and 5.3 In Schloetter v. Railoc of
Indiana, Inc.,35 a patent infringement suit, plaintiff moved to disqualify defendant's counsel, asserting violations of both Canons 4
and 9. Prior to association with the defendant's firm, attorney Jeffrey had performed services for the plaintiff on the original patent.
However, at the time this suit was filed, Jeffrey no longer had any
connections with the plaintiff and had terminated his membership
40
in defendant's firm.
Defendant argued, following Laskey, that on these facts its counsel should be allowed to rebut the imputation that they possessed
Jeffrey's knowledge concerning the plaintiff: In this regard, the
lower court noted that defendant's counsel had failed to rebut the
imputation of knowledge yet based its disqualification of defendant's firm on a Canon 9 violation. The appellate court affirmed the
holding of the district court. In dicta, the Seventh Circuit stated
that even if defendant's counsel had met its burden of rebuttal,
disqualification would still be necessary to avoid any appearance of
impropriety." "In these circumstances, all doubt should be resolved
in favor of disqualification ....
2"
The foregoing cases demonstrate that Canons 4, 5 and 9 are susceptible of diverse interpretation by both courts and attorneys. As
37. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1303-04 (N.D.
Ill. 1978).
38. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977); Emle
Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973). The Ernle court justified its reliance
on Canon 9 by observing:
The dynamics of litigation are far too subtle, the attorney's role in that process far
too critical, and the public's interest in the outcome is far too great to leave room
for even the slightest doubt concerning the ethical propriety of a lawyer's representation in a given case. These considerations require application of a strict prophylactic rule to prevent any possibility, however slight, that confidential information
acquired from a client during a previous relationship may subsequently be used to
the client's disadvantage.
478 F.2d at 571.
39. 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976).
40. There was a dispute as to whether the attorney in question should be considered a
former or a present partner in the defendant's firm. Plaintiff argued, in part, that the attorney's knowledge should be imputed to defendant's firm by virtue of his ongoing, frequent
contacts with that firm, which for purposes of Canon 4 made him a member of the firm. The
court found it unnecessary to decide the issue because disqualification would result regardless
of the attorney's partnership status. 546 F.2d at 708 n.2.
41. Id. at 711.
42. Id. at 712.
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the Second Circuit has observed, "[clompliance or noncompliance
with Canons of Ethics frequently do not involve morality or venality, but differences of opinions among honest men over ethical propriety of conduct.'

3 Perhaps

in recognition of the ethical quandries

in which well-meaning attorneys can find themselves, some courts
have established limits upon the applicability of these Canons.
Limitations Upon Mechanical Disqualifications
United States v. Standard Oil Co." restricted both the imputation of knowledge principle and the substantial relationship test. It
focused upon the size of the governmental agency involved and the
duties of the attorney within that agency.
The United States had filed suit to recover funds due from alleged
overcharges in crude oil sales financed by the Economic Cooperation
Administration (ECA), a part of the Marshall Plan. The ECA maintained offices throughout Europe as well as Washington, D.C. One
of the responsibilities of the Washington General Counsel's Office
was to draft, publish and enforce purchase and price regulations
under which petroleum products would be supplied to various European countries. The Paris General Counsel's Office took no part in
these matters.
The United States moved to disqualify the law firm representing
one of the defendants because a member of that firm had previously
been counsel for the Paris office of the ECA. The government contended that the attorney in question had obtained confidential information from plaintiff and that "he [had] passed upon or should
'' 5
have passed upon matters relating to the present controversy.
The defendant argued that because of the division of duties between the Washington and Paris offices, the attorney in question
had derived no knowledge relevant to the suit by virtue of his ECA
affiliation. Affidavits presented on this issue convinced the court
that there was no substantial relation between the attorney's former
responsibilities and the subject matter of the lawsuit. According to
the court, "[any other ruling would delete all meaning from the
word 'substantial'.""
As an alternative argument, the government contended that since
the Washington office possessed knowledge bearing a substantial
relation to the subject matter of the suit, and since there was a close
43. Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1977).
44. 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
45. Id. at 353.
46. Id. at 357. The court thus narrowed the scope of the substantial relation test to a
consideration of the individual attorney's relation to the subject matter as opposed to focusing
on the nature of the subject matter itself.
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association between the Paris and Washington offices, the knowledge of the Washington office should be imputed to the Paris office.
Therefore, if any attorney in the Paris office could be charged with
imputed knowledge, the attorney in question should also be so
charged."
In considering whether a boundary should be imposed upon the
imputation of knowledge in a vast, multi-office government agency,
the court rejected the government's strict imputation of knowledge
approach. Instead, it suggested that a distinction should be made
between vertical and horizontal imputation. As to the former, the
court recognized that an attorney should always be charged with the
knowledge of his juniors. As to the latter, however, the court concluded that an inquiry would be necessary to determine the appropriateness of charging an attorney with the knowledge of another
division head of coordinate rank within the same agency. 8 In analyzing the facts before it, the court refused to apply horizontal imputation of knowledge since it appeared unlikely that the attorney had
attained any knowledge of the oil transactions while situated in the
Paris office. With this distinction the Standard Oil court carved an
exception to the general rule of imputing knowledge to all members
of an office, at least when an attorney in a vast government agency
is involved. 4
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.50 also
qualified the imputation of knowledge principle but in a different
setting. The case involved the limited duties of an associate in a
large, single-office law firm. An attorney in plaintiffs law firm had
previously worked for a firm which had represented defendant in
substantially related matters. In response to a motion to disqualify,
plaintiff admitted that while in the employ of defendant's firm the
young associate had been involved with these substantially related
matters, but argued that his work had been limited to specific legal
47. Id. at 360.
48. Id. at 362.
49. Standard Oil also rejected disqualification based on an appearance of impropriety.
The court ruled that unless it was proven that the attorney had been specifically ordered to
consider the matter, there was not a close enough relation to give rise to an appearance of
impropriety. The court stated that:
[lit is hardly reasonable to hold that an appearance of evil can be found in his
undertaking a case against the government where there is not some closer factual
relationship between his former job and the case at hand other than that the same
vast agency is involved.
Id. at 364.
See Note, The Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification-SilverChrysler Steers in a
New Direction, 44 FORDHAm L. Rav. 130 (1975), for an argument that Canon 9 should apply
only to situations involving a former judicial or other public employment.
50. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
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questions. His only other involvement with the defendant had been
on matters unrelated to the controversy.
The Second Circuit recognized that it would be absurd to automatically conclude that an associate of a large law firm could have
knowledge of all clients and all confidential disclosures made by
clients to other lawyers in the firm. For this reason it differentiated
for disqualification purposes between "lawyers who become heavily
involved in the facts of a particular matter and those who enter
briefly on the periphery." ' 51 Therefore, the court held where an attor-

ney had been only peripherally involved in the subject matter of the
litigation, his role could not be considered "representation" within
Corp. As a result, the motion for disthe meaning of T. C. Theatre
5
qualification was denied.

At the time that the motions to disqualify were presented in
Westinghouse, two distinct methods of resolving conflicts of interest
and attorney disqualifications had evolved. The first, representing
the mechanical approach, emphasizes strict adherence to the letter
of the Canons.53 The second, best characterized as a rule of reason
51. Id. at 756.
In dicta the lower court had gone much further than the Second Circuit's holding. It had
observed that since the largest firms represent the largest corporations, it would be almost
impossible to have a major client avoid some kind of legal relationship with another major
client. In that situation, the court reasoned that it would be possible for attorneys within a
firm to effectively insulate themselves from exposure to confidences of other clients. Thus, a
mechanical imputation of knowledge to all members of a firm would not always be appropriate even where a substantial relationship has been demonstrated. Silver Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581, 588 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). In City of Cleveland
v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 440 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Ohio 1976), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d
1310 (6th Cir. 1977), an Ohio federal court indicated it would take a different perspective on
imputation of knowledge in the context of a large law firm. Instead of focusing on the degree
to which an attorney had been involved in the subject matter of the case, the court would
apply the vertical imputation standard established in Standard Oil. In dicta the court noted:
Imputing to an attorney in the private practice all confidential information obtained, or presumed to have been obtained, by other members of his law firm may
severely limit the scope of the private attorney's future career and the effective
operation of his firm, as well as the individual's right to legal counsel of choice. The
. . .rule in the private practice of law should therefore limit the imputation of
confidential disclosures, actual or presumed, to only those lawyers practicing in the
attorney's area of concentration. Absent direct proof to the contrary, the attorney
would not be deemed to have shared confidential information relating to matters
and services exclusively within the sphere of representation of another department
or section of his firm. This . . . rule is more acutely dramatized in the large,
departmentalized law firms characteristically more prevalent in an era of evolving
legal specialization.
Id. at 211.
52. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757 (2d Cir.
1975).
53. See, e.g., Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976); Consolidated
Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management, 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1954); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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approach," views the Canons as guidelines and calls for a balancing
of interests. Relevant considerations under the balancing approach
include the encouragement of public confidence in the legal profession, public interest in the outcome of the litigation and the client's
right to competent counsel of his choice. Also considered is the
attorney's right to unrestricted employment opportunities. In
Westinghouse the district court followed the latter method, while
the Seventh Circuit adhered to the former.
KIRKLAND DISQUALIFIED

The Facts
The conflict of interest alleged against Kirkland grew out of
events involving the purchase and sale of uranium. Westinghouse
is a major manufacturer of nuclear reactors. Upon the sale of the
reactors, Westinghouse often entered into a long term uranium sup5 On September
ply contract with the purchaser.1
8, 1975, Westinghouse notified several utility companies that performance of 17 of
its supply contracts had become commercially impracticable under
Section 2-615 of the Uniform Commercial Code.5" It claimed that it
was faced with a tremendous increase in price as well as a shortage
of supply due to several unforeseen circumstances.5 1 In response, the
affected utilities filed 13 federal actions, one state action, and three
foreign actions against Westinghouse, alleging breach of contract
and challenging the invocation of Section 2-615.
As an outgrowth of its defense of the contract actions, Westinghouse investigated the possibility that the uranium price increases
had been caused by conspiratorial activities of uranium producers.
This investigation culminated in an antitrust action filed on October 15, 1976, against 12 foreign and 17 domestic corporations engaged in various aspects of the uranium industry. Some of these
corporations also held ownership interests in the oil industry.
Throughout the uranium litigation, Westinghouse employed
Kirkland-Chicago as its lead counsel.
Contemporaneously with Kirkland-Chicago's representation of
Westinghouse in the uranium cases, Kirkland-Washington represented the American Petroleum Institute (API). In October, 1975,
54. See, e.g., Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751, 757
(2d Cir. 1975); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 446 F. Supp. 193 (N.D.
Ohio 1976), aff'd mem., 573 F.2d 1310 (6th Cir. 1977).
55. Barron's, Sept. 15, 1975, at 7.
56. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 26, § 2-615 (1963).
57. In particular, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 was cited as contributing to this crisis in
the uranium market. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1288
(N.D. I1. 1978).
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Congress was presented with legislative proposals to break up oil
companies, both vertically within the oil industry itself and horizontally by prohibiting ownership of other energy sources, including
uranium. This proposed legislation threatened oil companies with
a potential divestiture of millions of dollars of assets. Within a
month, the8 API had organized a committee to lobby against the
5
proposals.
On February 25, 1976, the committee contacted a partner of the
Kirkland-Washington office, retaining the firm to review the divestiture hearings. Kirkland was also to prepare arguments in opposition to the divestiture legislation, arrange testimony analyzing the
probable legal consequences and antitrust considerations of the legislation, and conduct a study of the probable effects of such legislation. 5 As part of the study, interviews were to be arranged with a
cross-section of petroleum industry personnel. The contact letter
between API and Kirkland-Washington concluded:
Your firm will, of course, act as an independent expert counsel
and hold any company information learned through these interviews in strict confidence, not to be disclosed to any other company, or even to API, except in aggregated or such other form as
will preclude identifying the source company with its data.10
Kirkland-Washington eventually interviewed representatives of
eight oil companies, including three defendants subsequently
named in the Westinghouse antitrust action. The Washington office's final report, issued on the same date that the Chicago office
filed the antitrust action, contains 230 pages of text and 82 pages
of exhibits. The uranium industry is the primary subject of 25 pages
of text and 11 pages of exhibits. The thesis of the report is that oil
company diversification does not threaten overall energy competition. In particular, the report claims that current increases in uranium prices had resulted from increasing demand and that oil company entry into uranium production has actually stimulated competition. The report also asserts that the oil companies have no incentive to act in concert to restrict uranium production and that the
historical record refutes any such charge. In conclusion the report
states that "the energy industries, both individually and collec58. The organization was known as the Committee on Industrial Organization. On December 10, 1975, API's president requested that each member company designate one of its
senior executives to facilitate coordination of the Committee's activities with the individual
companies. The Committee was organized into five task forces. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1313 (7th Cir. 1978).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1314.
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tively, are competitive today and are likely to remain so."2
In early 1977, three of the defendants in the antitrust action, who
were also API members,"3 filed motions to disqualify KirklandChicago as Westinghouse's counsel in the antitrust litigation. The
complaints were based on Canons 4, 5 and 9 of the ABA Code. The
oil companies' concern centered on the confidential information disclosed by their officials to Kirkland-Washington in interviews and
questionnaires which the firm had conducted and prepared for the
API report. Some of the information Kirkland-Washington had acquired from each company involved statistics concerning production, reserve holdings, prices, and competition within the uranium
industry."
District Court Decision
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., " the oil com-

panies argued that "Kirkland's simultaneous representation of both
Westinghouse and the API creates a substantial conflict of interest,
a potential for disclosure of confidential information, and the appearance of impropriety."" Kirkland did not deny that the antitrust
complaint and the API report developed opposite theses on the same
subject matter. Instead, it argued that an attorney-client relation62. Id.
63. The corporations asserting the conflict of interest were Kerr-McGee Corporation, Gulf
Oil Corporation, and Getty Oil Company. Several other motions to disqualify were also filed.
Twelve other corporate defendants presumed the validity of the oil companies' motion and
argued that if those companies were dismissed, equitable considerations would compel the
court to disqualify Kirkland from suing the remaining defendants. Another defendant, Noranda Mines Limited, filed a motion to dismiss Kirkland on the basis of a conflict arising from
Kirkland's prior representation of Noranda. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448
F. Supp. 1284, 1289 (N.D. Ill.
1978). See note 98 infra.
64. Samples of the questions relevant to the uranium industry included:
Are you presently developing coal reserves, uranium reserves? At what rate? If
you do not presently plan to develop certain reserves within the near future, why
not?
How easy or difficult is entry into the uranium mining and uranium milling
businesses?
Is the uranium industry competitive? Is that industry becoming more or less
competitive? What evidence could you give to support your answer?
What are the benefits from the entry of oil companies into uranium mining? Into
uranium milling?
Are the oil companies aiding uranium production?
Do the oil companies control the most producible and most economical uranium
reserves?
Have oil companies increased their holdings of uranium reserves faster than they
have increased uranium production?
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1315 n.2 (7th Cir. 1978).
65. 448 F. Supp. 1284 (N.D. 111.1978).
66. Id. at 1289.
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ship between Kirkland-Washington and the movants could not be
demonstrated because the Washington office's professional employment had been extended only to API, not to individual API member
companies. 7 Kirkland also contended that the API study did not
produce any significant confidential information which had been or
would be used against the oil companies in the antitrust suit.,,,
Finally, Kirkland argued that any actual or potential prejudice to
the oil companies would be outweighed by the hardship which Westinghouse would suffer if Kirkland were to be disqualified from this
complex piece of litigation. 9
The district court identified the issue before it as:
whether the mechanical disqualification of law firms for ethical
transgressions is an appropriate remedy in cases involving large
multi-city corporate law firms, enormously complex multi-district
litigation, and corporate litigants with nationwide and even multinational connections.70
Foreshadowing the decision in the case, Judge Marshall initially
noted that, "it is becoming increasingly difficult to insist upon absolute fidelity to rules prohibiting attorneys from representing overlapping legal interests."'"
The court agreed with Kirkland that no attorney-client relationship existed between the individual oil companies and KirklandWashington. 2 It therefore held that Kirkland could not have violated Canons 4 or 5. However, Judge Marshall also found that the
disclosures made by the oil companies to Kirkland-Washington
67. Id. at 1290.
68. Id. In support of this argument, Kirkland claimed that, except for aggregated data
on oil company assets and research and development expenses in alternative energy fields,
all quantitative data used in the API report had been derived from publicly available sources.
Also, all questionnaires had been returned to the companies when the report was completed.
Id. at 1295.
69. Id. at 1290. Kirkland quite possibly also had in mind the hardship it would suffer from
the loss of substantial fees should it be disqualified.
70. Id. at 1287. It should also be noted that in the same paragraph Judge Marshall referred
to the conflict as one involving a prior representation of the oil companies, rather than
characterizing it as a simultaneous representation problem.
71. Id. at 1287-88.
72. Id. at 1300-03. The district court based its determination on the fact that an attorneyclient relationship is one of agency and therefore the general law of agency applies. According
to Judge Marshall, the relationship arises only when the parties have given their consent,
either express or implied, to its formation.
The Seventh Circuit totally rejected the notion that an attorney-client relationship can
arise only under agency law. It found that the "professional relationship for purposes of the
privilege for attorney-client communications" depends upon the client's belief that he is
consulting a lawyer in that capacity, and upon his manifest intention to seek professional
legal advice. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 580 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.
1978).
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were closely related to the subject matter of the Westinghouse complaint." Since Kirkland-Chicago had placed itself in a position
where it would or at least could take advantage of the information
derived from these confidences, the court found some evidence of a
Canon 9 violation.7 ' However, it relied on a Fifth Circuit opinion75
for the proposition that a Canon 9 violation should result in disqualification only where two conditions are present. First, there must
exist a reasonable possibility of improper professional conduct and
second, public disapproval must outweigh the social interests served
by continued participation."
Applying this test, Judge Marshall found that only a remote possibility of misconduct existed. He noted that there was a "rigid
segregation"" in attorney duties resulting in part from the geographic separation of the Kirkland-Chicago and KirklandWashington offices. He also stressed the absence of any hint of an
exchange of confidential information between the two offices."
73. 448 F. Supp. at 1304. Note that the phrase "substantially related" was not used.
74. The court expressed frustration with Canon 9:
Canon 9, unlike Canons 1-8, is primarily aspirational in character. Its language is
all-inclusive, perfectionist and unmerciful. But at the same time, its command is
less comprehensively supported by the disciplinary rules which the bar has drafted
to implement and give teeth to the Canons. . . . Kirkland's apparent impropriety
does not fit within any of Canon 9's disciplinary rules. Instead, it falls in the twilight
zone of ethical transgressions, where black-letter rules blur into grayish hues.
Id.
75. Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
76. Id. at 813 n.12.
77. 448 F. Supp. at 1305.
There was one overlap between Chicago and Washington attorneys. William Jentes, one
of the lead attorneys working on the antitrust complaint had been requested by the API Legal
Task Force to prepare a memorandum. The memorandum analyzed arguments concerning
the possible expansion of the scope of existing antitrust laws to apply them to interlocking
directorates. That issue had been raised by proponents of the divestiture legislation as an
example of the collusive behavior of large corporations. The district court characterized this
as a "partial overlap" in that the memorandum addressed the antitrust issues from a theoretical perspective and contained nothing on uranium. Id. at 1296.
78. The court stated that:
[Allthough the Washington office did know of Kirkland's representation of Westinghouse on the utility contracts litigation, none of the Washington attorneys working on the API divestiture assignment knew of the separate Westinghouse antitrust
complaint until it was filed in court . . . . The Chicago attorneys also had little
awareness, if any, of the API work by the Washington office . . . . [Tihey state
they did not communicate with the Washington attorneys about the API work prior
to October 15 [, 1976,1 and had no knowledge of the data collected for the API
report.
Id. at 1296.
The court referred to the "changing realities of modern legal practice" and quoted extensively from Silver Chrysler Plymouth and City of Cleveland regarding the inappropriateness
of mechanically imputing knowledge to all members of a firm. Id. at 1304-05. See text
accompanying notes 50 and 51 supra; see note 51 supra.
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In addressing the second prong of the attorney disqualification
test, Judge Marshall initially examined the effects which disqualification would have on the public interest. He determined that forcing Westinghouse to retain new counsel lacking Kirkland's expertise
in the antitrust field as well as its familiarity with the case derived
from the contract litigation would only further delay the antitrust
suit. More importantly, disqualification might lead to the
"compromise [of] the just resolution of a vital public issue,"'79 since
high uranium prices are directly reflected in pubic utility costs. In
the final analysis, Judge Marshall concluded that any possible public suspicion did not outweigh the social interests which would be
served by Kirkland's continued representation. 0 The court therefore
denied the motions for disqualification notwithstanding its finding
of some evidence that a Canon 9 violation had occurred.
The Seventh Circuit's Decision
In Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,'"the Seventh Circuit overruled the district court's denial of the oil companies' motions to disqualify Kirkland. The appellate court primarily
objected to the tests which the lower court had employed in determining whether an attorney-client relationship had existed between
Kirkland and the three defendants.12 It found that the district court
had applied "too narrow an approach for determining whether a
lawyer's fiduciary obligation has arisen. 18 3 The deciding factor, according to the appellate court, should be the client's belief that he
is consulting a lawyer in his professional capacity at the time the
confidential disclosures are made." The court found that affidavits
presented to the district court had conclusively established this belief on the part of the oil companies. After concluding that an
attorney-client relationship had existed, the Seventh Circuit went
on to hold that Canons 4 and 5, in addition to Canon 9, would be
applicable to a consideration of the disqualification motions.
Having determined that Canons 4 and 5 were relevant, the court
79.
80.
81.
82.

448 F. Supp. at 1306.
Id.
580 F.2d 1311 (7th Cir. 1978).
The issues were presented by the court as follows:
(1) [Wjhether an attorney-client relationship arises only when both parties consent to its formation or can it also occur when the lay party submits confidential
information to the law party with reasonable belief that the latter is acting as the
former's attorney and (2) whether the size and geographical scope of a law firm
exempt it from the ordinary ethical considerations applicable to lawyers generally.
580 F.2d at 1312.
83. Id. at 1318.
84. See note 72 supra.
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reasoned that actual knowledge of an attorney should be imputed
to every member of his firm.8 5 It rejected Kirkland's assertion that
this imputation of knowledge should not be imposed since the flow
of information between its two offices with respect to matters at
issue in Westinghouse had been virtually nonexistent.86 The court
then emphasized that there is no basis for creating separate disqualification rules for large firms even though compliance with ethical
considerations may be more difficult for them by virtue of their
87
size .
The Seventh Circuit quoted, with apparent approval, the test
applied by the district court after it had found evidence of a Canon
9 violation. s However, in direct opposition to the lower court's ruling, the appellate court concluded that Kirkland's position in this
matter had created "a very reasonable possibility of improper professional conduct despite all efforts to segregate the two sizeable
groups of lawyers." 89 Kirkland had contemporaneously undertaken
two contradictory matters, "each involving substantial stakes and
[each] substantially related to the other."90 The court found that
the situation was sufficiently egregious to outweigh the client's interest in continuing with its chosen attorney.9' Accordingly, West85. 580 F.2d at 1321. Here the court cites Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind. Inc., 546 F.2d 706,
710 (7th Cir. 1976) and Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 435 F. Supp. 84, 96
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 567 F.2d 225, 229 n.10 (2d Cir. 1977).
86. See note 77 supra.
In a footnote to the decision, Judge Fairchild noted that he felt Kirkland was not relying
on a wall of separation theory. If a genuine separation in all relevant particulars between the
two groups of lawyers had been established, Judge Fairchild suggested that the court's decision may have been different. 580 F.2d at 1321 n.28.
87. The appellate court apparently attributed the formulation of such separate rules to
the district court. In fact, one of the two issues listed by the Seventh Circuit for resolution
involved whether the size of a law firm exempts it from certain ethical considerations. See
note 82 supra.
88. 580 F.2d at 1321. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
89. Id.
The remainder of the opinion involving the three oil companies dealt with the rejection of
a consent argument presented by Kirkland. Kirkland-Chicago had sought discovery from
Kerr-McGee Corp. and Getty Oil Co., and unsuccessfully from Gulf Oil Corp., relating to the
contract litigation in Virginia. Kirkland argued that the oil companies must have been aware
that Kirkland was representing Westinghouse. Therefore, since no objection had been raised
concerning this representation, the oil companies should be charged with consenting to that
representation. In addition, given Westinghouse's adverse position, the oil companies could
not honestly contend that they believed Kirkland also represented them. The court quickly
disposed of this contention by noting that the issue was not whether the oil companies had
been aware of Kirkland's representation of Westinghouse but whether they had been aware
that the representation would result in the antitrust suit. It appeared obvious to the court
that the three oil companies lacked this knowledge. Id.
90. Id. at 1322.
91. Id.
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inghouse was given the option of discharging Kirkland from the
antitrust suit or dismissing the three movants from the case. 2
Limited Value of Westinghouse: An Analysis
The Seventh Circuit handled the sensitive issue of attorney disqualification with great dispatch but with little clarity of reasoning.
While Canons 4, 5 and 9 were thought to be applicable in Westinghouse, the court failed to provide guidelines for future situations
involving possible ethical conflicts. The bulk of the opinion was
devoted to determining whether an attorney-client relationship
had existed,9" along with some misplaced emphasis on Kirkland's
size ."
However, the court never specifically found a violation of Canons
4, 5, or 9. Instead, by using the phrase "substantially related," the
court merely implied a Canon 4 violation." The court did determine
that the information acquired by the Kirkland-Washington attorneys was substantially related to the antitrust complaint filed by
Kirkland-Chicago." It also rejected any wall theory of separation "7
and imputed confidential knowledge to all members of both offices.
Despite this apparent use of a Canon 4 analysis of the problem, the
court failed to establish a nexus between the substantial relationship test and the imputation of knowledge.1
92. Westinghouse had retained a second law firm as co-counsel on February 17, 1978.
93. Without diminishing the importance of this issue, once it was resolved, more attention
to the applicability of the Canons was warranted.
94. See note 87 and accompanying text supra. Although Judge Marshall took a different
approach to the issue, the district court decision did not establish separate disqualification
rules for large law firms. Judge Marshall weighed the likelihood of harm to the oil companies
against the detrimental effects of disqualifying Kirkland. The size and geographical division
of Kirkland were considered relevant factors in deciding whether any of the oil companies'
confidential disclosures had been or would be misused in the antitrust litigation. However,
the court's reliance on these factors as an aid in determining an equitable balance cannot be
said to have created separate rules for large law firms.
95. 580 F.2d at 1322.
96. See text accompanying notes 55 through 64 supra. See, e.g., note 64 supra.
97. In rejecting the wall theory and imputing knowledge to all members of the firm, the
court cited two cases. The first, Schloetter v. Railoc of Ind., Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976),
supported the view that knowledge should be imputed to all members of an attorney's firm
but made no reference to the wall theory. In the second case, Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur
Anderson & Co., 567 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977), the law firm charged with a conflict of interest
argued that it had built a Chinese Wall within the firm so that no information passed between
the two groups of attorneys. The Fund of Funds court summarily dismissed this argument
by saying it did not believe that such a separation could be successfully created in a single
firm. Id. at 229 n.10. However, that case differed from Westinghouse because the law firm in
Fund of Funds was not geographically split. It is questionable whether these two cases support
the court's decision in Westinghouse that knowledge should be imputed to all members of
Kirkland.
98. In affirming the district court's denial of a disqualification motion presented by defendant Noranda Mines Limited (Noranda), the Seventh Circuit did indicate that a nexus
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By asserting that Kirkland had engaged in contemporaneous contrary undertakings, the court also implied a Canon 5 violation. Yet
the court did not consider whether Kirkland was able to exercise
independent professional judgment on behalf of both its clients. In
this regard, the court omitted all reference to EC5-14, 01s which
seems particularly relevant in this context.
If the court had found violations of Canons 4 and 5, then there
would have been no necessity to rule on Canon 9, other than in
response to the district court opinion. However, use of the phrase
"improper professional conduct"'' 1 suggests a Canon 9 violation.
Once again, the court did not elucidate the basis for such a finding.
Even if the Seventh Circuit had specifically found Canon violations and provided the rationale for such findings, the district
court's approach to and resolution of the disqualification motions
were far more reasonable.IN Compliance or noncompliance with ethical standards can generate honest disagreement among reasonable
people. The situations which give rise to such disagreements are
often brought about unintentionally. For these reasons, legal counsel should not be mechanically disqualified for nonconformance
with the literal letter of the ABA Code. In order to give proper
consideration to all competing interests, an equitable balancing
test, such as that used by Judge Marshall, should be required.
The district court opinion was sensitive not only to the gravity of
the ethical transgression involved, but also to the harm that would
be caused by attorney disqualification. Kirkland had not engaged
in the dual representation with the intention of violating the Code.
between substantially related subject matters of representation and client confidences was
necessary before disqualification would be appropriate. Noranda claimed that Kirkland's
representation of Westinghouse created a conflict of interest because the law firm had previously represented Noranda.
From 1965 to 1967, Kirkland was employed by Noranda on several matters, including
negotiations for the purchase of 51% of the shares of Essex Wire Corporation. Although the
purchase offer was ultimately rejected, Kirkland had organized an American subsidiary corporation for Noranda and had prepared a "Fact Book" which analyzed the competitive
impact of the proposed acquisition. Antitrust issues were researched because both Noranda
and Essex sold copper wire and cable in the United States.
The district court denied Noranda's motion because the prior representation concerned "a
completely different industry and a completely different time." 448 F. Supp. at 1310. Since
Noranda could not demonstrate a substantial relationship, disqualification was not required.
The Seventh Circuit agreed that "the more than 10-year past representations for two specific
matters unrelated to the present case did not warrant disqualification of Kirkland." 580 F.2d
at 1322.
99. 580 F.2d at 1322.
100. See note 29 supra.
101. 580 F.2d at 1321.
102. This position is taken only with respect to the equitable approach adopted by the
district court and not with respect to the treatment of the attorney-client relationship, which
is outside the scope of this article.
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At worst, it made an error in judgment. To discharge the firm would
deny Westinghouse qualified and experienced legal counsel, deny
Kirkland the right to represent a major client which was generating
substantial fees and further delay the complex antitrust litigation.
Judge Marshall felt that these harms outweighed the oil companies'
apprehensions concerning the possible misuse of confidential disclosures in the antitrust litigation.
If Judge Marshall had found an attorney-client relationship between Kirkland and the oil companies, he would then have been
forced to consider Canons 4 and 5. It is reasonable to assume that
in so doing he would have continued to apply a rule of reason approach similar to that established by his treatment of Canon 9.
Silver Chrysler could be relied on to support a finding that the
mechanical approach to the Code should be rejected.""
Kirkland-Washington attorneys had played no part in the antitrust suit, since there had been no contact with the Chicago office
relative to that suit. Even within the Chicago office itself, information on the suit had been closely guarded. Similarly, the KirklandChicago office had been only peripherally involved with work performed by the Washington office on behalf of the API.""4 On these
facts, neither office should be charged with having the knowledge
of the other, and therefore disqualification would not be warranted
under Canon 4.
A similar realistic approach to Kirkland's conduct would lead to
the conclusion that Canon 5 had not been violated either. Kirkland
was not representing the oil companies in the antitrust suit.
Kirkland-Washington's employment had extended only to the
preparation of the API report. Kirkland-Chicago cannot be considered to have represented the companies because it had been only
peripherally involved with the Washington office. Thus, Kirkland
was not simultaneously representing conflicting interests in litigation, and therefore the EC5-15 prohibition of such representation
should be inapplicable.
EC5-15 and EC5-16 indicate that dual representation may be
possible where interests are only potentially adverse."'5 Kirkland
103. See notes 50 through 52 and accompanying text supra.
104. The work performed by the one Kirkland-Chicago attorney for the API was precisely
the type which the Silver Chrysler court described as peripheral involvement. The attorney
prepared a memorandum analyzing arguments which had been raised in support of broadening the scope of antitrust laws so that they would apply to interlocking directorates. The
antitrust issues were discussed from a theoretical perspective and the uranium industry was
never mentioned. Furthermore, no Kirkland-Chicago attorney had any contact with any API
member or representative except the head of the API Legal Task Force. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 1284, 1296 (N.D. Il. 1978).
105. See notes 35 and 36 and accompanying text supra.
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submitted affidavits to the effect that no confidences had been disclosed between offices and that none would be used to the disadvantage of any party in the antitrust litigation. If the content of these
affidavits is accepted, then Kirkland has met the burden announced
in Cinema 5, Ltd. 06 of showing no actual or apparent conflict in
loyalties or reduction in the vigor of its representation.
Independent professional judgment can only be impaired where
the attorney has knowledge of relevant facts which might influence
his decision. This was not the case in Westinghouse. Furthermore,
the simultaneous issuance of the API report and filing of the antitrust suit, which took opposite stands on the same issue, indicates
that the professional judgment of each office had remained totally
independent.
Although a rule of reason approach to the facts in Westinghouse
would result in a finding of no violation of either Canon 4 or 5, it
could result in the finding of a Canon 9 violation since Kirkland's
conduct raises at least an inference of impropriety. However, the allinclusive yet vague nature of Canon 9 would make mechanical disqualification too drastic a remedy. Therefore, once evidence of a
Canon 9 violation is found, an equitable balancing of interests such
as that engaged in by Judge Marshall should be required.
A reasonable approach to attorney disqualification where an unknowing violation of the Code has occurred merely takes cognizance
of the present state of society. Legal relations between corporate
clients have become so enmeshed that it is likely that unchallenged
conflicts of interest frequently occur. 07 However, a rule of reason
approach to disqualification should not be used to circumvent the
dictates of the Code, especially where the violations were intentional.101
CONCLUSION

Disqualification of attorneys is always a sensitive issue for the
legal community, not only because it implies unethical conduct, but
also because it could result in the loss of both present and prospective fees. For Kirkland & Ellis, a firm of national repute earning
huge sums from its representation of Westinghouse, both of these
considerations were important.
The immediate result of the Seventh Circuit's decision is that
106. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
107. See Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons of Ethics and Intrafirm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1067-68 (1964), for a general discussion of
frequent interrelations between law firm clients.
108. Also, attorneys should not relax intra-firm policies and regulations which aid in
avoiding potential conflicts of interest.
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Westinghouse has lost qualified and experienced legal counsel and
that the oil companies need no longer worry about the possible
misuse of confidential disclosures made to Kirkland-Washington. In
addition, it is conceivable that the outcome will assure the public
that the legal profession is guided by a Code which operates for the
benefit of clients.
However, the Seventh Circuit's application of the Code has serious implications for future attorney disqualification motions. As the
district court recognized, in the modem legal world of large law
firms and vast corporate clients, a mechanically applied Code of
Professional Responsibility could lead to unnecessary injustice.
Therefore, while the district court did not relax the standards of the
Code, it did relax the remedies for inadvertent violation where potential harm to the complaining party is minimal.
The district court opinion was well-reasoned and could serve as a
useful guide to the legal community. The Seventh Circuit opinion
is quite the opposite. Unfortunately, since the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, it is the Seventh Circuit's decision
to which attorneys must look for direction on the issue of attorney
conflicts of interest.
TED HELWIG

Introduction
At the time this symposium issue was conceived, the Illinois
Supreme Court had under consideration a proposed Illinois evidence code. The court has since decided to take no action at this
time on the proposal.
The proposed code was modeled primarily on the Federal Rules
of Evidence, and as such, it retained those problems associated with
the Federal Rules. In that sense, rejection of the proposed code may
actually be beneficial. Nevertheless, the Illinois common law of evidence is badly in need of reform, as these articles and notes demonstrate. What is needed now is not a blind acceptance or rejection of
the federal pattern, but a reasoned, balanced approach to Illinois
rules of evidence. Rejection of the proposed code should only be a
step toward a more cohesive and fair Illinois evidence code.
THE
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